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WHY REMOVING 101 WON’T BE ENOUGH AND WHAT TO DO 
INSTEAD 
Daniel Cole* 
Congress recently released a reform proposal for Section 101 
of the U.S. Patent Act. The draft included the following language: 
“No implicit or other judicially created exceptions to subject 
matter eligibility including ‘abstract ideas,’ ‘laws of nature, or 
‘natural phenomena,’ shall be used to determine patent eligibility 
under Section 101, and all cases establishing or interpreting those 
exceptions to eligibility are hereby abrogated.”1 This is a blatant 
attempt to overturn Alice Corp v. CLS Bank International,2 Mayo 
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,3 and 
related cases which created the judicial exceptions that prevent the 
patenting of “abstract ideas,” “laws of nature,” and “natural 
phenomena.” However, simply abrogating the cases with language 
like the above will not be enough to survive the Supreme Court. 
Without significant alterations to the proposed text, the effort to 
abrogate the judicial exceptions is doomed to failure. Section I of 
this article briefly explores the reasons Mayo and Alice need to be 
abrogated. Section II investigates the legal and philosophical 
 
 *  After receiving a Master’s degree in biochemistry from Wake Forest and 
teaching chemistry at community colleges across North Carolina, Daniel 
received a law degree from the University of North Carolina. Currently, he helps 
established and startup companies with patent and trademark issues at the Olive 
Law Group. He has a special interest in patentability issues as well as 
international and famous trademark issues. When not thinking about technology 
or law, he enjoys playing with his cat as well as reading and watching sci-fi. 
This paper is dedicated to Ron and Benita Cole as well as Samarah Shakir. 
Thank you for always believing in me and making me believe in myself. 
1 See Eileen McDermott, Draft Text of Proposed New Section 101 Reflects 
Patent Owner Input, IPWATCHDOG (May 22, 2019), 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/05/22/draft-text-proposed-new-section-101-
reflects-patent-owner-input/id=109498/ [https://perma.cc/N2S4-86TN]. 
 2 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 208 (2014). 
 3 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 67 
(2012). 
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underpinnings of Mayo and Alice. Section III discusses how Mayo 
and Alice’s legal underpinnings doom the current legislative 
proposal. Contrary to the opinions of some,4 these cases do have a 
constitutional basis and interested parties ignore that basis at their 
peril. Section IV provides alternative ways forward. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
One half of the 2015 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine 
was awarded to Tu Youyou for the discovery of Artemisinin.5 
According to the Nobel Prize Committee, this discovery will have 
 
 4 See Gene Quinn, Sherry Knowles Scrutinizes an Activist Supreme Court and 
its Unconstitutional Approach to Patent Eligibility, IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 16, 
2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/01/16/sherry-knowles-scrutinizes-
activist-supreme-court-unconstitutional-patent-eligibility/id=105228/ 
[https://perma.cc/FD5G-L8YR]; Gene Quinn, Does the Supreme Court Even 
Appreciate the Patent Eligibility Chaos They Created?, IPWATCHDOG (Nov. 12, 
2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/11/12/103256/id=103256/ 
[https://perma.cc/SC74-JAPS]. 
 5 Press Release, Nobel Assembly at Karolinska Institutet, The Nobel Prize in 
Physiology or Medicine 2015 (Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.nobelprize.org/ 
prizes/medicine/2015/press-release/ [https://perma.cc/MJ9W-TUH3] 
[hereinafter Nobel Assembly]. 
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“consequences in terms of improved human health and reduced 
suffering [that] are immeasurable.”6 However, if Ms. Youyou 
applied for a patent on Artemisinin in the United States, it would 
be denied under Section 101 of the Patent Act as a product of 
nature. 
The Patent Act controls the operations of the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) which grants inventors 
patents on their inventions.7 The Patent Act contains three main 
Sections: 101, 102, and 103.8 Section 103 governs determining if 
the proposed invention is merely obvious over the prior art and 
therefore not deserving of a patent.9 Section 102 governs 
determining if the proposed invention is novel over the prior art 
and so deserving of a patent.10 Section 101 governs eligible subject 
matter and states that articles of manufacture, machines, processes, 
compositions of matter, or improvements of the above are 
patentable.11 
So-called judicial exceptions to 101 have arguably existed 
since the 1800’s,12 but the U.S. Supreme Court recently 
rejuvenated them in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International,13 Mayo 
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,14 and 
related cases. Alice, Mayo, and related cases held that abstract 
ideas, laws of nature, and natural phenomena are unpatentable.15 
As Artemisinin, is produced by the sweet wormwood plant, it 
would be an unpatentable natural product.16 
 
 6 Id. 
 7 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 148 
(1989). 
 8 Id. at 148–50; 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03 (2018). 
 9 Bonito Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. at 150. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. at 148. 
 12 See infra Section II. 
 13 See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 208 (2014). 
 14 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 67 
(2012). 
 15 See Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 208; Mayo Collaborative, 566 U.S. at 67; see 
also infra Section II. 
 16 See Nobel Assembly, supra note 5. 
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In the past, inventors would claim a purified form of a natural 
compound, and these patents held up in court.17 Current law would 
invalidate these patents. The Supreme Court has held broadly that 
natural products are unpatentable.18 Myriad Genetic’s argument 
that isolating BRCA genes19 from the human genome20 made the 
isolated genes patent eligible was rejected by the Supreme Court.21 
The Supreme Court made no mention of any of the lower court 
cases upholding purified forms of a natural compound. However, 
the Supreme Court would likely hold isolated Artemisinin is still 
simply natural Artemisinin like the isolated BRCA gene was still 
simply the natural BRCA gene. The USPTO in its eligibility 
examples certainly takes this approach.22 The only tenable 
explanation is that, though worthy of a Nobel Prize, Artemisinin is 
unpatentable. 
Natural products, however, are “almost an inexhaustible array 
of molecular entities”23 and an “infinite resource for drug 
development [.]”24 The fact that around half of the drugs approved 
during the last thirty years, several of them blockbuster drugs, are 
derived from natural products makes their critical role in modern 
 
 17 See generally Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156 
(4th Cir. 1958) (upholding a patent on a purified form of vitamin B12); Parke-
Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (upholding 
patented claims on purified adrenaline). 
 18 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 
(2013). 
 19 Particular mutations, changes in the DNA base structure, at particular points 
in the genome lead to increased risk of cancer. Myriad Genetics, 569 U.S. at 
582–83. Mutation in the BRCA gene is known to lead to an increased risk of 
breast cancer. Id. at 583. 
 20 Myriad Genetics, 569 U.S. at 593. 
 21 Id. 
 22 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY 
EXAMPLES: LIFE SCIENCES 4, 18–19 (May 4, 2016) 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ieg-may-2016-ex.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UUF3-H62N]; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, NATURE-
BASED PRODUCTS 4, 6–8, 10, 12, 14–15 (Dec. 16, 2014), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/mdc_examples_nature-
based_products.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9AN-TJR3]. 
 23 Ciddi Veeresham, Natural Products Derived from Plants as a Source of 
Drugs, 3 J. ADVANCED PHARM. TECH. & RES. 200, 200 (2012). 
 24 Id. 
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drug discovery self-evident.25 All of these drugs would now be 
patent ineligible. 
Currently, discovering and bringing a new drug to market costs 
upwards of 2.8 billion dollars.26 Why would any company spend 
this incomprehensible amount of money if the well-funded and 
established generic industry could market the invention as soon as 
it is approved by the FDA without the associated exorbitant costs? 
Unless the return on investment is economically justified, the 
incentive is removed. As our current battery of antibiotics becomes 
unusable,27 do we really want to remove the business justification 
for finding viable natural replacements? Expecting debt-strapped 
governments to pick up the slack is naïve. The imbalance between 
legal protections and business incentives is illustrated by the 
decrease since 2009 in private venture capital and equity 
investment in biotechnology medical devices and 
pharmaceuticals.28 
The change in incentives has also impacted the software 
industry as shown by reduced investment in the software space.29 
Recognizing these facts David Kappos, the director of the USPTO 
under President Obama from 2009 to 2013, has called for the 
removal of Section 101.30 Mr. Kappos reasoned that (1) current 
 
 25 Id. 
 26 Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: New 
Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20, 27 (2016). 
 27 See Ryan W. Miller, Drug-Resistant Superbugs are Killing Thousands of 
Americans. Here’s What You Need to Know About Them, USA TODAY (last 
updated Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/health/ 
2019/11/15/antibiotic-resistant-superbugs-killing-thousands-what-
know/4189718002/ [https://perma.cc/4DRZ-DNR7]. 
 28 David O. Taylor, Patent Eligibility and Investment, CARDOZO L. REV. 
(forthcoming) (SMU Dedman Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 
414, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3340937 [https://perma.cc/RPN7-E7FB]; 
Jason Rantanen, Guest Post on Patent Eligibility and Investment: A Survey, 
PATENTLYO (Mar. 6, 2019), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2019/03/patent-
eligibility-investment.html [https://perma.cc/32JQ-3MJD]. 
 29 Taylor, supra note 28. 
 30 Telephone Interview with David J. Kappos, Dir., U.S. Patent & Trademark 
Office (2016) [hereinafter Kappos Interview]; see also Daniel Cole, Should 
Section 101 of the Patent Act be Removed, IPWATCHDOG (June 23, 2016), 
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eligibility law threatens protection of key American industries,31 
(2) Europe and Asia have no problems constraining patent eligible 
subject matter without a section equivalent to 101,32 and (3) the 
policy issues dealt with by Section 101 can be better dealt with 
through use of Sections 102 and 103.33 Since America “is 
providing less protection than other countries[,]” an inventor is 
better off seeking patents in Europe or China.34 
Modern economies are based on innovation. If America is 
going to continue its economic and global leadership, we need to 
increase, not decrease, the rewards for innovation. Grueling hours 
spent in the lab or the machine shop require incentive.35 “[L]osing 
the innovative edge and becoming economically dominated by 
other countries is how modern countries die.”36 
In an attempt to address the above concerns Congress recently 
released a draft proposal that would reform Section 101 of the 
Patent Act. The draft included the following language: “No 
implicit or other judicially created exceptions to subject matter 
eligibility, including ‘abstract ideas,’ ‘laws of nature,’ or ‘natural 
phenomena’ shall be used to determine patent eligibility under 
Section 101, and all cases establishing or interpreting those 
exceptions to eligibility are hereby abrogated.”37 The draft proposal 
cited above is a blatant attempt to overturn the eligibility cases 
discussed above. However, simply abrogating the cases with 
language like the above will not be enough to eliminate the 
exceptions. Without significant alterations to the proposed text, the 
effort to make abstract ideas, laws of nature, and natural 




 31 Kappos Interview, supra note 30. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Cole, supra note 30. 
 36 Id. 
 37 See Eileen McDermott, Draft Text of Proposed New Section 101 Reflects 
Patent Owner Input, IPWATCHDOG (May 22, 2019), 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/05/22/draft-text-proposed-new-section-101-
reflects-patent-owner-input/id=109498/ [https://perma.cc/KU5B-5VS4]. 
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II. THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL UNDERPINNINGS OF 
MAYO AND ALICE 
When modern courts deal with the judicial exceptions to 
Section 101 of the Patent Act, they do so using what has come to 
be known as the Mayo Alice two-step. Claims are first analyzed to 
see if they are directed to one of the judicial exceptions. In the 
second step, claims found to be directed to one of the judicial 
exceptions are analyzed to see if enough has been added to the 
claims to make them eligible. One of the most common criticisms 
of the current 101 decisions is that they inappropriately incorporate 
concerns more properly addressed in 102 and 103.38 Often cited is 
the fact that the Court has used the presence of manual non-
computer based analogues to label ideas abstract,39 Congressional 
removal of inventiveness as a specific patentability requirement,40 
and the Court’s focus on if claim elements are well-understood or 
conventional.41 However, as will be seen throughout this article, 
those citing these concerns neglect or lack an understanding of 
patent eligibility precedent. 
A.  Precedent for Incorporating Novelty and Obviousness into 101 
Evaluations 
1. Patents Found Ineligible 
Bilski and Mayo are two modern cases that are often criticized 
for incorporating concerns more properly addressed in 102 and 
 
 38 See Ron Laurie, Alice in Blunderland: The Supreme Courts Conflation of 
Abstractness and Obviousness, IPWATCHDOG (Dec. 11, 2014), 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/12/11/alice-in-blunderland-the-supreme-
courts-conflation-of-abstractness-and-obviousness/id=52563/ 
[https://perma.cc/GCC8-A7XZ]; Clarifying the Distinction Between the 
“Inventive Concept” and “Patentability” requirements when determining 
Patent-Eligible Subject Matter, CARSTENS & CAHOON LLP, 
https://www.cclaw.com/2016/10/21/clarifying-distinction-inventive-concept-
patentability-requirements-determining-patent-eligible-subject-matter/ 
[https://perma.cc/P63E-JNEE] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020); Paxton M. Lewis, 
The Conflation of Patent Eligibility and Obviousness: Alice’s Substitution of 
Section 103, 2017 UTAH L. REV. ONLAW 13 (2017). 
 39 See Laurie, supra note 38. 
 40 See Clarifying the Distinction, supra note 38. 
 41 See Lewis, supra note 38. 
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103. An analysis of these cases and how they relate to Diamond v. 
Diehr, Parker v. Flock, Gottschalk v. Benson, Funk Brothers, 
Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co, Rubber-Tip Pencil Company v. 
Howard, O’Reilly v. Morse, Le Roy v. Tatham illustrates the 
precedent for such inclusion. The claim at issue in Bilski v. Kappos 
included the steps of: 
(a) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider 
and consumers of said commodity wherein said consumers purchase 
said commodity at a fixed rate based upon historical averages, said 
fixed rate corresponding to a risk position of said consumers; 
(b) identifying market participants for said commodity having a 
counter-risk position to said consumers; 
(c) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider 
and said market participants at a second fixed rate such that said series 
of market participant transactions balances the risk position of said 
series of consumer transactions.42 
Claim 4 converted this process into a mathematical formula.43 
Later claims limited the process to certain industries44 or suggested 
using well-known methods to determine variables in the equation.45 
The Supreme Court found the claims unpatentable partially 
because they were not “tied to a particular machine or apparatus”46 
and they did not “transform a particular article into a different state 
or thing.”47 Limiting use to energy markets was simply limiting an 
abstract idea to one field of use or adding token post-solution 
components.48 
In Mayo,49 which established the modern understanding of the 
Product and Law of Nature exception,50 the Court found the claim 
unpatentable partially because it only contained conventional and 
 
 42 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 599 (2010). 
 43 Id. at 595. 
 44 Id. at 610. 
 45 Id. at 595. 
 46 Id. at 596. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 608. The Court cited Le Roy v. Tatham, Funk Brothers v. Kalo 
Inoculant Co., Diamond v. Diehr, Parker v. Flook, and Gottschalk v. Benson in 
reaching this decision. 
 49 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012). 
 50 Id. 
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obvious activity when the law of nature was removed.51 The Court 
characterized the claim as stating a natural law that applied 
conventional obvious methods.52 As described in relation to Bilski, 
worrying about parts of the claim being obvious or conventional 
are 102 and 103 concerns. 
Diamond v. Diehr53 dealt with the patentability of an algorithm 
embodied using a digital computer involved in curing synthetic 
rubber.54 Claim 1 of the patent read: 
A method of operating a rubber-molding press for precision molded 
compounds with the aid of a digital computer, comprising: 
providing said computer with a database for said press, including at 
least, 
natural logarithm conversion data (ln) 
the activation energy constant (C) unique to each batch of said 
compound being molded, and 
a constant (x) dependent upon the geometry of the particular mold of 
the press, 
initiating an interval timer in said computer upon the closure of the 
press for monitoring the elapsed time of said closure 
constantly determining the temperature (Z) of the mold at a location 
closely adjacent to the mold cavity in the press during molding, 
constantly providing the computer with the temperature (Z) 
repetitively calculating in the computer, at frequent intervals during 
each cure, the Arrhenius equation for reaction time during the cure, 
which is 
ln v = CZ + x 
where v is the total required cure time, 
repetitively comparing in the computer at said frequent intervals during 
the cure each said calculation of the total required cure time calculated 
with the Arrhenius equation and said elapsed time, and 
opening the press automatically when a said comparison indicates 
equivalence.55 
 Even based solely on claim length the specificity of the 
Diehr claim when compared to the Bilski claim is obvious. The 
 
 51 Id. at 76. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
 54 Id. at 177. 
 55 Id. at 193 n.5. 
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Court characterized the claim here as necessarily including (1) 
continuously measuring the temperature inside a rubber curing 
mold cavity, (2) using the continuously changing temperature to 
calculate a continuously changing cure time using the Arrhenius 
equation, and (3) signaling the computer to open the press when 
the proper cure time is reached.56 In contrast to Diehr, the 
mathematical formula used was applied to a known structure or 
process.57 Importantly, all of this discussion was part of deciding if 
the claim was eligible under 101. 
Parker v. Flook dealt with what the Court determined was 
simply an algorithm.58 Claim 1 of the patent read: 
A method for updating the value of at least one alarm limit on at least 
one process variable involved in a process comprising the catalytic 
chemical conversion of hydrocarbons wherein said alarm limit has a 
current value of 
Bo + K 
wherein Bo is the current alarm base and K is a predetermined alarm 
offset which comprises: 
(1) Determining the present value of said process variable, said present 
value being defined as PVL; 
(2) Determining a new alarm base B1, using the following equation: 
B1 = Bo(1.0-F) + PVL(F) 
where F is a predetermine number greater than zero and less than 1.0; 
(3) Determining an updated alarm limit which is defined as B1 + K; 
and thereafter 
(4) Adjusting said alarm limit to said updated alarm limit value.59  
Again, even a simple comparison of this claim with Diehr 
highlights the differences in specificity. The Court characterized 
this claim as requiring (1) measuring the present value of the 
process variable, (2) using a specific algorithm to calculate an 
updated alarm limit value, and (3) updating the actual alarm limit 
 
 56 Id. at 178. 
 57 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 607–08 (2010). Along with the cases cited 
by Bilski, the Court cited Rubber Tip Pencil, O’Reilly v. Morse and Mackay 
Radio & Telegraph in reaching their decision. 
 58 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
 59 Id. at 596–97 (spacing in original). 
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to the adjusted value.60 In discussing 101 eligibility, the Court 
separated out steps they considered to be conventional.61 Only once 
these steps were removed could the eligibility of what was left be 
considered under 101.62 
One of the first cases dealing with the eligibility of computer 
inventions, Gottschalk v. Benson,63 dealt with converting binary-
coded decimal numbers into pure binary numbers.64 The Court 
characterized the question as “whether the method described and 
claimed is a process within the meaning of the Patent Act.”65 As 
detailed in the introduction, the patentability of processes is 
established by Section 101 of the Patent Act. In denying the 
patentability of the claim, the Court focused on (1) the general 
nature of the invention as claimed,66 and (2) the fact it could be 
performed on “existing computers”67 or even without a computer.68 
Funk Brothers dealt with a mixture of “selected mutually non-
inhibitive strains of different strains of bacteria of the genus 
Rhizobium.”69 Similarly to Flook, the Court separated out what 
they characterized as obvious applications of the natural 
principle.70 The 101 question of import was not can the sale of 
artificially mixed non-inhibitive species of Rhizobium be protected 
by a patent, but is the fact that some strains of Rhizobium are 
mutually non-inhibitive patentable.71 Once it was known that 
certain strains of Rhizobium were mutually non-inhibitive, mixing 
 
 60 Id. at 585. 
 61 Id. at 588, 590–94. 
 62 See id. at 594. 
 63 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
 64 Id. at 66–67. 
 65 Id. at 64. 
 66 Id. at 65. 
 67 Id. at 67. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 132 n.1 (1948). 
 70 Id. at 131. 
 71 Id. at 131–32. Rhizobium bacteria take nitrogen from the air and “fix” it in 
soil in a form that can be absorbed by plants. Different strains work better for 
different types of plants, but these strains generally kill each other. The 
eponymous Funk brothers discovered strains of Rhizobium that did not kill each 
other and attempted to patent a mixture as fertilizer. 
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them was the product of skill—not invention.72 Mixing them and 
selling them as fertilizer was obvious.73 
Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co.74 turned on claim 
interpretation and enablement. However, while discussing 
mathematical expressions of scientific truths are not patentable, the 
Court stated “novel and useful structure[s] created with the aid of 
knowledge of scientific truth may be [patentable].”75 Novelty of 
invention is not mentioned in Section 101 of the Patent Act – it is 
only mentioned in Sections 102 and 103.76 
Precedent for incorporating novelty and obviousness into 101 
evaluations can even be found in the everyday lead pencil. In 
Rubber-Tip Pencil Company v. Howard,77 the detachable eraser 
was found to be patent ineligible.78 According to the Court, once 
the well-known erasive and elastic properties of rubber were 
removed from the disclosure only an idea was left. Using 
precedent and philosophy that will be discussed infra the Court 
found the idea unpatentable. Considering if parts of the invention 
are well-known is a 103 consideration. 
The patent for arguably one of the most important inventions of 
the 19th century, the telegraph, was constrained when the Court 
incorporated 102 and 103 concepts into an eligibility discussion. In 
O’Reilly v. Morse,79 Morse claimed “the use of the motive power 
of the electric or galvanic current . . . however developed, for 
making or printing intelligible characters, signs or letters at any 
distances . . . .”80 Citing the importance of allowing others to 
practice novel, nonobvious improvements, the court limited 
 
 72 Id. at 132. 
 73 See id. 
 74 Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 306 U.S. 86 
(1939). 
 75 Id. at 94. 
 76 See supra Introduction. 
 77 Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498 (1874). 
 78 Id. at 507. 
 79 O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853). 
 80 Id. at 86. 
MAR. 2020] Why Removing 101 Won't Be Enough 153 
Morse’s rights to the specific method contained in his 
specification.81 
As will be discussed infra Le Roy v. Tatham82 established the 
101 exceptions as well as their legal and philosophical basis. 
Important here is that even in this foundational case considerations 
of novelty and obviousness were an important part of the eligibility 
discussion. Le Roy v. Tatham arguably established both the 101 
exceptions as well as the legal and philosophical basis for them.83 
Considerations of novelty and obviousness were an important part 
of the eligibility discussion. The district court instructed the jury 
that even if the “combination of machinery in the abstract [was] 
not new”84 the invention was eligible since it applied a newly 
discovered principle.85 The Supreme Court overturned this 
instruction.86 
2. Patents Found Eligible 
Along with looking at patents found ineligible, it is instructive 
to look at patents the court found eligible. The fact that novelty and 
non-obviousness of the claims were consistently crucial to the 
claim’s eligibility illustrates how considerations of novelty and 
non-obviousness have always been part of eligibility 
considerations. 
Tilghman v. Proctor87 claimed “the manufacturing of fat acids 
and glycerin from fatty bodies by the action of water at a high 
temperature and pressure.”88 Noting that methods of producing 
glycerin from fatty bodies and water at 400 degrees existed at the 
time of the patent,89 the Court used the specification90 to construe 
 
 81 Id. at 113–14. 
 82 Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1852). 
 83 See infra Sections II-B and II-C. 
 84 Id. at 159. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 174–75. 
 87 Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1880). 
 88 Id. at 709. 
 89 Id. at 734. 
 90 The specification is the figures and description included in a patent, it’s 
basically everything other than the section starting with “I claim . . . .” which is 
called the claims. 
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the claim as “the process of subjecting to a high degree of heat a 
mixture continually kept up, of nearly equal quantities of fat and 
water in a convenient vessel strong enough to resist the effort of 
the mixture to convert itself into steam.”91 This novel and 
nonobvious claim was eligible.92 
Similarly, the claim in New Process Fermentation Co. v. 
Maus93 read: “[t]he process of preparing and preserving beer for 
the market, which consists in holding it under controllable pressure 
of carbonic acid gas from the beginning of the kraeusen state until 
such time as it is transferred to kegs and bunged, substantially as 
described.”94 Using the specification, the Court construed the claim 
as: 
[W]hen the beer has been put into the casks, and the kraeusen beer is 
added to it, and the apparatus is applied at the beginning of the 
kraeusen stage, the beer will be kept under a controllable pressure of 
carbonic acid gas until such time as it is fit to be transferred to the kegs 
for market, such pressure resulting in the complete and speedy 
clarification of the beer, although it is in a state of active fermentation 
in closed shavings casks, with the incidental results of no loss of beer, 
no fouling of the casks or the cellar, no alteration of the flavor of the 
beer, and no danger to the health of the workmen.95 
This novel and nonobvious invention96 was patent eligible.97 
Expanded Metal Company v. Bradford98 provides another 
example where novelty and non-obviousness were critical to claim 
eligibility under Section 101. The claim at issue in Expanded 
Metal Company read: 
The herein described method of making open or reticulated metal work, 
which consists in simultaneously slitting and bending portions of a 
plate or sheet of metal in such manner as to stretch or elongate the bars 
connecting the slit portions and body of the sheet or plate, and then 
similarly slitting and bending in places alternate to the first mentioned 
 
 91 Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 729. 
 92 See id. at 729–30. 
 93 New Process Fermentation Co. v. Maus, 122 U.S. 413 (1887). 
 94 Id. at 423. 
 95 Id. at 428. 
 96 See id. at 424–27. 
 97 Id. at 428. 
 98 Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 366 (1909). 
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portions, thus producing the finished expanded sheet metal of the same 
length as that of the original sheet, substantially as described.99 
“The[] record[] [in Expanded Metal Company left] no doubt 
that there are substantial advantages in the method of the patent in 
suit.”100 This novel and nonobvious claim was eligible under 
101.101 
It is true that Section 102 and Section 103 did not exist when 
some of these earlier cases were decided.102 This has not, however, 
made a difference to the Court. Exactly how obviousness and 
novelty should be considered in eligibility decisions has been 
debated by the Court. Three judges believed that limiting the 
patent in Flook to catalytic conversion made it patentable.103 Four 
judges believed that under Flook the disclosure in Diamond. v. 
Diehr was ineligible.104 As the above discussion shows however, 
all the judges believed that novelty and obviousness should be 
considered in eligibility decisions.105 
B. Legal Precedent for the 101 Exceptions 
Ever since Thomas Jefferson referred to “the public 
embarrassment of an exclusive patent,”106 patentability has had a 
rocky history in the United States. But even though precedent 
exists for incorporating 102 and 103 considerations into 101 
decisions, surely those who say no precedent exists for the 101 
 
 99 Id. at 377. 
 100 Id. at 378. 
 101 Id. at 385–86. 
 102 See Patents, 35 U.S.C. (1952); Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109; Patent Act 
of 1836, 5 Stat. 117. Earlier Patent Acts had portions similar to Section 101 and 
102, but they were part of a general patentability section. Obviousness was not 
introduced until 1952 when Section 101, 102, and 103 were added. 
 103 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 599–600 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 104 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 204–18 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 105 But see id. at 188–91 n.12 (discussing the impropriety of importing section 
102 and 103 considerations into 101). But as shown by above discussion of 
cases since 1975 this discussion has been ignored by the court and is at odds 
with earlier precedent. 
 106 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 13:333–335 (Andrew A. Lipscomb 
& Albert Ellery Bergh, eds., 1905). 
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exceptions107 are correct. Section 101 of the Patent Act lists no 
exceptions and simply states that articles of manufacture, 
machines, processes, compositions of matter, or improvements of 
the above are patentable.108 As with the incorporation of 102 and 
103 into 101, a careful and thoughtful reading of the historical 
cases elucidates the legal and philosophical underpinnings and why 
those who say they do not exist are incorrect. 
1. Abstract Ideas 
The modern articulation of the “abstract idea” exception was 
made in Alice Corp v. CLS Bank.109 Claim 33, which reads as 
shown below, was used as a representative claim: 
A method of exchanging obligations as between parties, each party 
holding a credit record and a debit record with an exchange institution, 
the credit records and debit records for exchange of predetermined 
obligations, the method comprising the steps of: 
(a) creating a shadow credit record and a shadow debit record for each 
stakeholder party to be held independently by a supervisory institution 
from the exchange institutions; 
(b) obtaining from each exchange institution a start-of-day balance for 
each shadow credit record and shadow debit record; 
(c) for every transaction resulting in an exchange obligation, the 
supervisory institution adjusting each respective party’s shadow credit 
record or shadow debit record, allowing only these transactions that do 
not result in the value of the shadow debit record being less than the 
value of the shadow credit record at any time, each said adjustment 
taking place in chronological order, and at the end of the day the 
supervisory institution instructing on[e] of the exchange institutions to 
exchange credits or debits to the credit record and debit record of the 
respective parties in accordance with the adjustments of the said 
 
 107 See Gene Quin, Sherry Knowles Scrutinizes an Activist Supreme Court and 
its Unconstitutional Approach to Patent Eligibility, IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 19, 
2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/01/16/sherry-knowles-scrutinizes-
activist-supreme-court-unconstitutional-patent-eligibility/id=105228/ 
[https://perma.cc/5NFS-MSTC]; Gene Quin, Does the Supreme Court Even 
Appreciate the Patent Eligibility Chaos They Created?, IPWATCHDOG (Nov. 12, 
2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/11/12/103256/id=103256/ 
[https://perma.cc/JJ89-6PBU]. 
 108 See Bonito Boats Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 148 
(1989). 
 109 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). 
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permitted transactions, the credits and debits being irrevocable time 
invariant obligations placed on the exchange institutions.110 
The Court characterized this as an intermediary creating and 
updating account ledgers as real-world accounts changed, and only 
allowing transactions that kept the accounts in the black.111 The 
Court determined the claims were directed to the well-known idea 
of intermediated settlement,112 and amounted to generic computer 
implementation of an abstract idea,113 and were thus invalid.114 
In deciding if claims directed to a judicial exception115 have 
enough extra material, the obviousness and novelty of this extra 
material is analyzed.116 As was discussed previously, incorporating 
such 102 and 103 considerations into 101 analysis has a long 
precedent.117 
Claim 1 in Bilski, which was cited by Alice,118 was cited supra 
and will not be repeated here. Claim 4 converted this process into a 
mathematical formula.119 Later claims limited the process to certain 
industries120 or suggested using well-known methods to determine 
variables in the equation.121 The Court found this an ineligible 
attempt to patent the application of the abstract idea of risk 
hedging in energy markets.122 The Court struck down the patent.123 
 
 110 Id. at 209 n.2. 
 111 Id. at 210, 216. 
 112 Id. at 215–18 (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); O’Reilly v. 
Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1852); Diamond v. 
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); Parker 
v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978)). 
 113 Id. at 216, 220–23. 
 114 Id. at 220–23. 
 115 Abstract Idea, Phenomena of Nature, and Natural Product are commonly 
referred to as the judicial exceptions. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). 
 116 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 76 
(2012). 
 117 See supra Section II-A. 
 118 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 210 (2014). 
 119 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. at 606. 
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Since the Court found the claims in Diamond v. Diehr 
eligible,124 it provides an important contrast. Claim 1 of the Diehr 
patent was cited in the previous section. As a reminder, the court 
characterized the steps of the invention as: (1) continuously 
measuring the temperature inside the mold cavity, (2) using the 
continuously changing temperature to calculate a continuously 
changing cure time using the Arrhenius equation, and (3) signaling 
the computer to open the press when the proper cure time is 
reached.125 The Court characterized this not as an attempt to patent 
the Arrhenius equation or even an abstract application of the 
Arrhenius equation, but an application of the law of nature to a 
concrete physical process.126 The Court also made much of the 
arguably minor lexicological fact that the claim in question was a 
process rather than a method claim as in Flook.127 As discussed 
previously,128 four Supreme Court justices, citing Flook, would 
have invalidated the claims.129 
Flook, Gottschalk, and Rubber Tip Pencil were discussed in 
detail in the last section. In each of these cases, the invention was 
found ineligible as an abstract idea or as the court described it in 
Rubber Tip Pencil as early as the late 19th century an unpatentable 
“idea of itself.”130 
Corning v. Burden131 is somewhat problematic but important. 
Corning held that patents were grantable for “the means or method 
of producing a certain result”132 but not “the result or effect 
produced.”133 This was a significant alteration of the language used 
in previous cases, and was not used in subsequent cases. Taken 
 
 123 Id. at 609 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); Parker v. 
Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Le Roy v. 
Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1852); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980)). 
 124 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188. 
 125 Id. at 178. 
 126 Id. at 187–88. 
 127 Id. at 188 n.10. 
 128 See supra notes 102-05. 
 129 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 204–18 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 130 Rubber Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 507 (1874). 
 131 Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252 (1853). 
 132 Id. at 268. 
 133 Id. 
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literally this language would seem to prohibit the patenting of new 
states of matter. New states of matter, such as pharmaceutical 
drugs, would certainly seem to be results or produced effects of 
means or methods. This may be why the language was dropped. 
How later cases deal with Corning and with Cochrane,134 which 
defined a patentable process as acts transforming an item to a 
“different state or thing”135 is important context for the 
philosophical basis for the 101 exceptions. 
The Supreme Court overturned the instruction, stating that a 
newly discovered principle applied using non-new machinery and 
methods was patentable in Le Roy.136 The Court also stated: 
It is admitted that a principle is not patentable. A principle, in the 
abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these can 
not be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive 
right. Nor can an exclusive right exist to a new power, should one be 
discovered in addition to those already known. Through the agency of 
machinery, a new steam power may be said to have been generated. 
But no one can appropriate this power exclusively to himself under the 
patent laws. The same may be said of electricity and any other power in 
nature which is alike open to all and may be applied to useful purposes 
by the use of machinery.137 
As early as 1852 in Le Roy v. Tatham, the Court established 
that abstract ideas were ineligible for patenting, an idea that was 
later referenced and reinforced in Alice which is seen as the 
modern interpretation of this exception. Just because the lower 
courts, USTPO, and the Patent Bar ignored over 150 years of 
precedent, does not mean the Supreme Court will do so. At most 
the Supreme Court could overrule this precedent, but the precedent 
must be acknowledged and a well-reasoned and researched 
argument presented for overturning it. So far no one has presented 
such an argument to the Supreme Court. 
 
 134 Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780 (1876). 
 135 Id. at 788. 
 136 See Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 174–75 (1852). 
 137 Id. 
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2. Products, Laws of Nature 
Similarly, as to how Alice established the modern 
understanding of the abstract idea exception,138 the modern 
understanding of the “product of nature” or “law of nature” 
exception was established by Mayo.139 The contested claim in 
Mayo read: 
A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an 
immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder, comprising: 
(a) administering a drug providing 6-thioguanine to a subject having 
said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder; and 
(b) determining the level of 6-thioguanine in said subject having said 
immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder, 
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine less than about 230 pmol per 8x108 
red blood cells indicates a need to increase the amount of said drug 
subsequently administered to said subject and 
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per 
8x108 red blood cells indicates a need to decrease the amount of said 
drug subsequently administered to said subject.140 
At the time the patent was filed it was known that measurement 
of 6MP metabolites, such as 6-thioguanine, could be used to 
predict the clinical efficacy and tolerance to thiopurine drugs.141 
The specific ranges claimed, however, were novel. Under the first 
step in the Mayo two step analysis, because the detected ranges 
were determined by the metabolism of thiopurine drugs by the 
patient’s body, the Court characterized the claims as relating to a 
natural process/law.142 Following the next step in the Mayo two 
step analysis,143 the Court characterized the rest of the claim as 
obvious and conventional, and so invalidated the patent.144 
 
 138 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). 
 139 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012). 
 140 Id. at 74–75. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. at 77. 
 143 See id. 
 144 Id. at 70–71, 94 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981); 
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601 (2010); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 
303, 309 (1980); Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156, 175 (1853); O’Reilly v. 
Morse, 15 How. 62, 112-120 (1854); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 
(1972); Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 306 U.S. 86 
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Isolated genes and other natural products were found ineligible 
for patenting in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics.145 Myriad Genetics discovered the location and sequence 
of two genes, BRACA1 and BRACA2, that, when mutated, 
drastically increase the risk of breast and ovarian cancer.146 Myriad 
Genetics claimed isolated DNA coding for various BRACA 1 and 
2 sequences.147 Simply separating the gene from its surrounding 
genetic material was an act of discovery, not invention, and thus 
not patentable.148 Chakrabarty was differentiated because Myriad 
Genetics did not add any genetic information to a living 
organism.149 
Diamond, Bilski, O’Reilly, Gottschalk, and Mackay Radio have 
been discussed previously150 and will not be discussed further. It is 
important to note, however, that their citations in this case 
illustrates how the Court sees the Section 101 exceptions as a 
wholistic entity. This is key to the philosophical basis of the 
Section 101 exceptions and potential legislative strategies.151 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty,152 held that living things were patent 
eligible,153 but continued to acknowledge the Section 101 
exceptions.154 A bacterium altered by the hand of man such that it 
broke down crude oil was eligible.155 The law of relativity,156 the 
law of gravity,157 a newly discovered mineral,158 and a wild plant,159 
however, were not patent eligible. 
 
(1939); and Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,333 U.S. 127, 130 
(1948)). 
 145 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology et al. v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 
U.S. 576, 596 (2013). 
 146 Id. at 582–83. 
 147 Id. at 584. 
 148 Id. at 592 n.4. 
 149 Id. at 590–91. 
 150 See supra Section II. 
 151 See infra Section III. 
 152 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 153 See id. at 310. 
 154 Id. at 305, 310. 
 155 Id. at 303, 310. 
 156 See id. at 309. 
 157 See id. 
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As discussed previously, the court separated out the obvious 
application from the natural principle in Funk Brothers.160 The fact 
that some strains of Rhizobium did not kill each other was a law of 
nature.161 No human had created the non-inhibitive strains of 
Rhizobium—nature had.162 As such, there was no invention.163 
The Telephone Cases164 provide an early example showing the 
ineligibility of natural laws but the eligibility of applications of 
them.165 The Court characterized Bell as claiming the manipulation 
of electricity in specific ways to carry sound166 and not on the use 
of electricity itself.167 The former was patent eligible.168 The latter 
was not.169 
Contrarily, the Court found the claims in Morse an attempt to 
patent a natural principle.170 The Court went to great lengths in 
Tilghman,171 where the court found a biological process patentable, 
as discussed previously,172 to differentiate Morse from The 
Telephone Cases. Processes that applied natural laws were 
patentable while natural laws themselves were not.173 
The Court’s reasoning seems to point to some sort of 
physicality requirement. The Court analogized Morse to Neilson v. 
Harford.174 The Court in Tilghman characterized the unpatentable 
principle in Neilson through its statement, “a hot-blast is better 
 
 158 See id. 
 159 See id. 
 160 See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131, 132 
(1948). 
 161 Id. at 130. 
 162 See id. at 132. 
 163 See id. 
 164 Dolbear v. American Bell Tel. Co., 126 U.S. 1 (1888) [hereinafter “The 
Telephone Cases”]. 
 165 See generally id. 
 166 Id. at 534. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. at 535. 
 169 Id. at 534. 
 170 See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 113–17 (1853). 
 171 Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1880). 
 172 See id. at 733–34. 
 173 See id. at 722–23. 
 174 Neilson v. Harford, 151 Eng. Rep. 1266 (1841). 
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than a cold blast for smelting iron.”175 What Neilson patented, 
however, according to the Tilghman Court, was the interposition of 
“a receptacle for heated air between the blowing apparatus and the 
furnace.”176 The Tilghman Court construed the claims in Tilghman 
and Neilson as claiming an application of the natural power rather 
than the power itself.177 Tilghman and Neilson, however, have 
significant structure in their allowed claims.178 Tilghman included a 
vessel strong enough to resist explosion while Neilson included a 
receptacle.179 
This structural requirement may help explain the Court’s hair 
splitting between Flook and Diehr. Diehr required a rubber-
molding press, a database unique to each press and an apparatus 
capable of constantly determining the temperature of the mold 
cavity.180 Flook, on the other hand, had no comparable apparatus 
limitations. Regardless, the key point here is that the Court 
discussed natural law patent ineligibility all the way back in the 
mid 1800’s.181 
As with Alice, Le Roy was cited by Mayo which established the 
modern understanding of the product of nature/natural law 
exception. Since the relevance of Le Roy as legal precedent for the 
abstract idea exception has already been discussed, the case will 
not be discussed here except to point out that it applies equally to 
the product of nature/natural law exception. The discussions of 
new powers can easily apply to natural products/natural laws, 
especially since the example the Court uses is steam. Like with the 
abstract idea exception, just because the lower courts, USPTO, and 
the Patent Bar miss the implications of precedent, does not mean 
the Supreme Court will. 
 
 175 Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 724. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 726; see also Neilson, 151 Eng. Rep. at 1266. 
 178 See Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 727; see also Neilson, 151 Eng. Rep. at 1266. 
 179 See Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 714; see also Neilson, 151 Eng. Rep. at 1266. 
 180 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 175 (1981). 
 181 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978)) 
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C. The Philosophical Underpinnings of the 101 Exceptions 
As was noted in the previous section, the Supreme Court cites 
cases dealing with the abstract idea exception when finding 
something as ineligible as a Natural Law or Natural Product. This 
is because, as will be seen, the philosophical underpinning for all 
of the exceptions, according to the Court, is the same. So, this 
section, unlike the previous, will not be further subdivided. 
According to the Court, the 101 exceptions are necessary to 
prevent the patenting of basic tools of scientific and technological 
work.182 This is necessary because patenting these basic tools 
would “inhibit future innovation premised upon them.”183 
Inhibiting innovation in this way would be against both the policy 
of the patent law and the “very point of patents.”184 The importance 
or excellence of the invention was irrelevant since “brilliant 
discovery does not by itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry.”185 The Court 
made this blatantly clear in Alice,186 Myraid,187 and Mayo.188 In 
Mayo, the Court went so far as to characterize patent law as a 
“two-edged sword”189 capable of both spurring and obstructing 
information flows.190 Bilski echoed this same concern when it 
stated that courts must balance the “tension, ever present in patent 
law, between stimulating innovation by protecting inventors and 
impeding progress by granting patents when not justified by the 
statutory design.”191 Doing anything less would “put a chill on 
creative endeavor and dynamic change.”192 
This concern is not limited to the more modern 101 cases of the 
21st century, however. Flook also turned on ensuring the use of 
 
 182 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 587 
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 187 Myriad, 576 U.S. at 596. 
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(2012). 
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basic scientific building blocks was not preempted. Even though 
the claim was limited to the catalytic chemical conversion of 
hydrocarbons, this was not enough of a limit for the Court.193 This 
is clearly articulated by the dissent’s argument that limiting the 
claims to conversion of hydrocarbons prevented preemption.194 
Furthermore, the animating concern in Gottschalk v. Benson was 
how preventing the preemption of basic scientific building blocks 
is proven by a differentiation from Corning. In reference to 
Corning, the Court in Gottschalk remarked that “[t]he chemical 
process or the physical acts which transform the raw material are 
[in Corning], however, sufficiently definite to confine the patent 
monopoly within rather definite bounds.”195 Thus, the claims in 
Corning could be allowed, but since Gottschalk lacked such 
definite chemical processes or physical acts, its claims could not. 
This same concern can be traced back to the 19th century. 
Gottschalk noted how Bell did not claim “all telephonic use of 
electricity.”196 In the Telephone Cases, the Court noted this 
themselves when they stated that Bell’s claims were not for “the 
use of a current of electricity in its natural state,”197 but rather a 
continuous circuit of electricity in a closed circuit “into a certain 
specified condition[] suited to the transmission of vocal and other 
sounds.”198 Even in the two earliest cases that arguably established 
the judicial exceptions—Morse and Le Roy199—extensive 
preemption of later discoveries and interference with patent law 
policy was the issue. Morse’s claims were invalid since they would 
prevent inventors of improvements from practicing those 
improvements.200 Le Roy’s claims were invalid since a contrary 
holding “by creating monopolies, would discourage arts and 
 
 193 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 586 (1978). 
 194 Id. at 599–600 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 195 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972) (referencing Corning v. 
Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267 (1853)). 
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 198 Id. at 534. 
 199 See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 62 (1853); Le Roy v. Tetham, 55 U.S. 
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 200 See Morse, 56 U.S. at 113–14. 
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manufactures, against the avowed policy of the patent laws.”201 The 
101 exceptions exist because the Court believes, and has since the 
late 1800s, that they are necessary to prevent patent law from 
inhibiting as opposed to promoting scientific advancement. 
III. WHY THE CURRENT LEGISLATIVE FIX IS DOOMED 
As the previous discussion shows, the Section 101 exceptions 
have been around at least since 1852.202 What may not be as 
obvious, but becomes clear with a little discernment, is that the 
Supreme Court did not invent the exceptions without “support 
anywhere in the law . . . out of whole cloth.”203 As explained 
above, the Court consistently based the Section 101 exceptions on 
ensuring patent law encouraged, rather than discouraged, 
innovation. The constitutional connection has not been stated 
directly. The Court has never held The Patent Act unconstitutional. 
The Constitution grants Congress the power to write patent laws. 
Article 1 Section 8 of the Constitution reads in part: “The Congress 
shall have the Power to . . . promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”204 
The connection should now be obvious to even the most 
casual, intellectually honest observer. The Court believes the 
Constitution limits Congress’s power to implement patent law. 
Patent law can only be enacted when it promotes the progress of 
science and the useful arts, and the Section 101 exceptions are 
necessary to ensure current patent law meets this requirement. The 
Court did not quote this clause when referring to eligibility 
concerns until relatively modern times,205 but the Court stated in Le 
 
 201 Le Roy, 55 U.S. at 175. 
 202 See supra notes 197–99 and accompanying text (exceptions may have been 
around even earlier in the decisions of lower courts). 
 203 Gene Quinn, Mayo v. Prometheus: A Lawless Decision by an Omnipotent 
Court Wreaking Havoc on Patents, IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 23, 2017), 
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 204 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 205 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 181 (1981). 
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Roy that allowing the disputed claims “would discourage arts and 
manufactures, against the avowed policy of the patent laws.”206 The 
Court invalidated Morse’s patent largely because the Court 
believed allowing it would inhibit development of 
improvements.207 Tilghman reiterated the importance of this 
holding by quoting it extensively.208 Specifically, the Court noted 
positively that Tilghman did not “claim every mode”209 of 
separating fatty acids and glycerin using water.210 Expanded Metal 
Co. acknowledged the importance of considering the patent laws’ 
“object and purpose.”211 
The modern cases make the connection between the 
Constitution and the Section 101 exceptions even more explicit. 
Chakrabarty began its decision by directly stating: 
The Constitution grants Congress broad power to legislate to “Promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.” The patent laws promote this progress by 
offering inventors exclusive rights for a limited period as an incentive 
for their inventiveness and research efforts.212 
Bilski states that the Section 101 exceptions “serve a critical 
role in adjusting the tension, ever present in patent law, between 
stimulating innovation . . . and impeding progress.”213 The Section 
101 exceptions keep patent law from “put[ing] a chill on creative 
endeavor[s] and dynamic change[s].”214 This thread continued in 
Mayo where the Court characterized patent law as a “two-edged 
sword”215 that had to be prevented from “inhibit[ing] further 
discovery.”216 In Myriad, the Court stated that the Section 101 
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exceptions were necessary because they prevented the “inhibit[ion] 
[of] future innovation”217 by averting the “tie[ing] up”218 of “basic 
tools of scientific and technological work.”219 In Alice, the Court 
grounded the Section 101 exceptions most strongly in the 
Constitution when it stated: 
We have described the concern that drives this exclusionary principle 
as one of pre-emption . . . Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and 
abstract ideas are “the basic tools of scientific and technological work.” 
“[M]onopolization of those tools through the grant of a patent might 
tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it,” 
thereby thwarting the primary object of the patent laws. (Congress 
“shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts”). We have “repeatedly emphasized this . . . concern that patent 
law not inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up the future use 
of” these building blocks of human ingenuity.220   
Even in cases that do not touch directly on the Section 101 
exceptions, the Court has emphasized the importance of ensuring 
the patent laws don’t inhibit innovation. American patent law rests 
on “the need to promote innovation,”221 due to the cost in time and 
money of research and development.222 However, the patent clause 
“is both a grant of power and a limitation.”223 Congress “may not 
overreach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional 
purpose,”224 nor may the patent monopoly be enlarged “without 
regard to the innovation, advancement or social benefit gained 
thereby,”225 and the “standard expressed in the Constitution . . . 
may not be ignored.”226 It could be argued, of course, that the 
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statements in Kewanee Oil, Bonito Boats, and John Deere are 
dictum.227 However, the Courts exhortation not to read conditions 
and limitations into patent law that lacks legislative support, which 
has been used to support expansive patent rights, was taken from a 
case dealing with shop rights and assignment.228 In a world where 
the Supreme Court can make dictum non-dictum at any time, 
treating Supreme Court cases as if they contain no dictum seems 
the safer course. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has a habit of 
quietly overturning itself. In Expanded Metal Co., the Court held 
that “a process or method involving mechanical operations, and 
producing a new and useful result” is patentable,229 while Risdon 
Iron held that the only patentable processes were chemical in 
nature or used a natural force such as electricity.230 In Expanded 
Metal Co., the Court stated it would not question the decision in 
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Risdon231 and the syllabus simply stated that Risdon was 
“distinguished.”232 This is common Supreme Court practice.233 
Let me be blunt. For reasons I will lay out in detail below, I 
abjectly disagree with the Supreme Court reasoning cited in many 
of these cases. Patenting natural products, natural processes, and 
abstract ideas does not inhibit the progress of science. Removing 
the economic incentive, as the Supreme Court has for research 
around natural products, natural processes, and abstract ideas does 
inhibit science. It can also certainly be argued that the Constitution 
does not inhibit Congress’s power the way the Supreme Court 
thinks it does. Further, it is in my economic interest to convince 
people that the Supreme Court invented the exceptions without 
“support anywhere in the law,” creating them “out of whole cloth 
without any authority.”234 
However, this does not mean I can ignore the obvious Section 
101 exception precedent, the clear philosophical basis for that 
precedent, or what that means for the proposed changes to Section 
101. Doing so would be (1) intellectually dishonest, (2) require me 
to ignore what I know about the Supreme Court’s treatment of 
precedent, or (3) require me to ignore what I know to be true 
because it suits my economic interests. Legal and personal ethics, 
along with my inner sense of morality makes this impossible.235 
Where does this leave the proposed Section 101 changes? As 
the above discussion proves, the Supreme Court did not invent the 
101 exceptions without support. The exceptions go back at least 
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one-hundred and sixty-seven years, and are based in Le Roy, which 
based their existence on patent law’s public policy foundations as 
expressed in the Constitution’s Patent Clause. The exceptions 
constitutional foundation was recognized in both Le Roy’s 
historical and modern progeny as well as in unrelated historical 
and modern cases. The proposed changes directly abolish the 
exceptions.236 If the language is passed “as is,” the Court is likely 
to find the amended clause unconstitutional. Citing Le Roy, Morse, 
Tilghman, Expanded Metal, Flook, Chakrabarty, Bilski, Mayo, and 
Alice, the Court would likely overtly ground the exceptions in the 
Constitution. If the Court felt the need for additional support, it 
would likely cite Bonito Boats, Kewanee Oil, and Graham v. John 
Deere. Certainly, counter-arguments exist, some of which will be 
discussed in the section below, but the best way forward is not by 
disregarding clear legal precedent, but rather by remembering that 
Article I, Section 8, clause 8 is not the only part of the Constitution 
that intellectual property law is based on. 
A. How to Overcome the 101 Exceptions 
Perhaps the most obvious argument against finding the 
proposed changes to Section 101 unconstitutional, is that they will 
not decrease the advancement of science and the useful arts. 
Evidence the proposed changes will not decrease advancements 
certainly exists, especially in the biotechnology space.237 However, 
counter-evidence also exists. For example, the effects of the 
exceptions on software and internet technologies is not as 
pronounced as in the biotechnology space.238 Moreover, 
presidential commissions have argued against the patenting of 
computer programs,239 and much economic research questions the 
success or necessity of patent based incentives.240 Certainly further 
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counter-evidence supporting the necessity of patent incentives also 
exists.241 The difference in incentives’ necessity in the computer 
and biotech space is especially noteworthy given the above 
discussion of the Supreme Court’s application of reasoning from 
“natural product” and “natural process” cases to the “abstract 
ideas” cases.242 The Court is unlikely to apply the exceptions 
differently based on technological sector. 
If the Court uses the Constitution to invalidate the new law, 
why not consider revising the Constitution? The Constitution was 
last successfully amended in 1992 by an amendment originally 
proposed in 1789.243 Amending the Constitution requires that an 
amendment first be proposed by “two thirds of both Houses,”244 or 
during a constitutional convention called by “the Legislatures of 
two thirds of the several States.”245 Ratification of a proposed 
amendment requires ratification by the legislatures of three fourths 
of the several States246 or ratification by constitutional conventions 
in three fourths of the several States.247 Achieving this level of 
unanimity is difficult even in the best of times. This is why the 
Constitution has only been amended 27 times in its one-hundred-
and-thirty-one-year history. 
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As an example of the above, in 2010, the Supreme Court 
decided that limiting the amount of money corporations could 
donate to political causes violated the First Amendment.248 The 
decision became controversial almost instantly. A 2018 University 
of Maryland study249 found that three fourths of respondents 
overall, 66 percent of Republicans and 85 percent of Democrats, 
wanted to overturn Citizens United with a constitutional 
amendment.250 An admittedly smaller Bloomberg poll251 in 2015, 
found that 78 percent of respondents wanted the ruling 
overturned.252 Multiple groups such as Public Citizen,253 Common 
Cause,254 and The Stamp Stampede255 are mobilizing to propose a 
constitutional amendment. Multiple celebrities and well-known 
 
 248 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 249 Steven Kull et al., Americans Evaluate Campaign Finance Reform 
Program, PROGRAM FOR PUB. CONSULTATION (May 2018), 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4455238-
campaignfinancereport.html [https://perma.cc/PMX7-NS3Y]. 
 250 Id.; Ashley Balcerzak, Study: Most Americans want to kill ‘Citizens 
United’ with constitutional amendment, PUB. RADIO INT’L (May 10, 2018), 
https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-05-10/study-most-americans-want-kill-
citizens-united-constitutional-amendment [https://perma.cc/GS5Y-F7J2]. 
 251 See Cristian Farias, Americans Agree on One Thing: Citizens United is 
Terrible, HUFFPOST (Sept. 29, 2015), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/citizens-
united-john-roberts_n_560acd0ce4b0af3706de129d [https://perma.cc/6VTW-
E56C]. The noted Bloomberg poll had only 1001 participants. 
 252 Id.; see also Greg Stohr, Bloomberg Poll: Americans Want Supreme Court 




 253 PUBLIC CITIZEN, https://www.citizen.org/ [https://perma.cc/LZH2-Q3M3] 
(last visited Mar. 11, 2020). 
 254 Amend the Constitution to Overturn Citizens United, COMMON CAUSE, 
https://actionnetwork.org/petitions/amend-the-constitution-to-overturn-citizens-
united?source=takeactionpanel&_ga=2.233513502.1865421674.1562184607-
1253684198.1562184607 [https://perma.cc/7SH6-NS68] (last visited Mar. 11, 
2020). 
 255 Overturn Citizens United, THE STAMP STAMPEDE, 
https://www.stampstampede.org/money-out-voters-in/overturn-citizens-united/ 
[https://perma.cc/KY4A-KQ3X] (last visited Mar. 11, 2020). 
174 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 21: 141 
politicians such as George Clooney,256 Rosario Dawson,257 and 
Bernie Sanders258 have all come out in support of a constitutional 
amendment overturning Citizens United. So, the movement is not 
lacking in star power. Still though, while constitutional 
amendments have been proposed in Congress,259 none have passed 
either house. If a Supreme Court decision that arguably 78 percent 
of the population disagrees with cannot be overturned by 
constitutional amendment, overturning a group of decisions 
supported by over 150 years of precedent260 and powerful non-
governmental interests is likely an impossibility. 
In a related proposal, an attempt could be made to convince the 
Court that the first clause of Article 1 Section 8 Clause 8 does not 
limit the second clause. This would be like the winning argument 
in District of Columbia v. Heller,261 where the first clause of the 
Second Amendment was held to be a non-limiting prefatory 
clause.262 Since such a decision would go against over 150 years of 
precedent,263 this argument too is unlikely to succeed. 
All is not lost, however, as the Patent Clause is not the only 
constitutional power under which the government can grant 
monopolies. In the Trademark Cases,264 the Court found the 
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government had the power “to establish the conditions on which 
these rights shall be enjoyed and exercised, the period of their 
duration, and the legal remedies for their enforcement”265 under the 
Commerce Clause if the act was limited to “commerce with 
foreign nations, commerce among the States, and commerce with 
the Indian tribes.”266 Trademark law is currently so limited.267 
There is no reason that a patent law specifically making products 
of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas, patentable could 
not be similarly upheld under the Commerce Clause. 
It could be argued that the Trademark Cases allow enactment 
of a law simply not enabled, rather than nullified by the Patent 
Clause.268 The Court did state “we are unable to see [in the Patent 
Clause] any such power.”269 This does seem to imply that the 
Patent Clause neither allows nor prevents the enactment of 
trademark legislation. As explained above, the Court is likely to 
hold that the Patent Clause prevents enactment of patent laws 
negating the judicial exceptions.270 However, in National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,271 the government 
stated that the Commerce Clause prevented the government from 
compelling commerce and thus imposing a penalty on those who 
didn’t buy health insurance.272 The individual mandate was “not 
consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution.”273 It was an 
“act[] of usurpation”274 and “deserve[d] to be treated as such.”275 
The individual mandate was, however, constitutional under 
Congress’s power to tax.276 
This legal reasoning shows a practical yet honest way forward. 
Congress should acknowledge, without agreeing with, the Court’s 
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position that the Patent Clause prevents the patenting of natural 
products, natural processes, and abstract ideas. Congress should 
then make a law overturning these exceptions and blatantly rely on 
the Commerce Clause to do so. Sebelius can be used to defeat the 
argument that one enumerated power cannot allow what another 
enumerated power prohibits. In a world where an act of Congress 
can be prevented by one clause of the Constitution in the strongest 
possible terms but allowed by another, a law only arguably 
prevented by the Patent Clause could be allowed by the Commerce 
Clause. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Alice and Mayo are based on precedent going back at least 150 
years. Consistently from Le Roy to Mayo and Alice, the Court 
based the Section 101 exceptions on the need to prevent patent law 
from inhibiting innovation. A direct line can be drawn from this 
reasoning to U.S. Constitution article 1, section 8, clause 8. This 
clause has historically been used as the basis for Congress enacting 
patent law. The current legislative changes to Section 101 are a 
blatant attempt to overturn the decisions establishing the judicial 
exceptions to Section 101. Given that the Court bases these 
exceptions on U.S. Constitution article 1, section 8, clause 8 the 
Court is likely to find the amended Section 101 unconstitutional. 
To avoid this, Congress should explicitly base the amendments, 
and thus all of patent law, on the Constitution’s Commerce Clause. 
The argument that one part of the constitution cannot allow what 
another part forbids can be negated using Sebelius. 
